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Hanoch Ben-Pazi 
Rebuilding the Feminine in Levinas's Talmudic Readings 
 ―The female experience is other for the male experience, not only 
because of its different nature but because, in a certain sense, otherness 
is its nature‖.1 
 
 This study presents a reconsideration of Levinas‟s concept of the feminine. 
This reconsideration facilitated by a philosophically informed analysis of Levinas‟s 
Talmudic readings on that subject. 
 The subjects of Levinas‟s exploration of the feminine, in this view, emerge 
from his Talmudic readings, but his phenomenological analysis of those very subjects 
goes beyond what can be found in those readings. Analyzing the meaning of the 
difference between the sexes - the topic of one of the Talmudic readings - leads 
Levinas to a wider phenomenological treatment of the status of woman that does not 
bypass the feminine voice. Delving into the Talmudic concept of rodef (persecutor) as 
applied to the relationship of fetus and mother leads Levinas to a phenomenological 
analysis of the concept of maternity and readiness to accept responsibility (even 
suffering) for the Other. Those two discussions lead us to a rereading of Levinas‟s 
essay “Phenomenology of Eros” and enable us to rebut the charge that in that essay 
Levinas presents only a masculine voice. Levinas‟s concept of “responsibility” will be 
seen to resemble the feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan‟s concept of “care.” We 
must then reconsider whether Levinas‟s concept of the feminine is exclusively the 
domain of women. 
 
A Methodological Remark 
Among Levinas‟s philosophical writings, one may discern two types of works. One 
type is his strictly philosophical writings, in which he is an adherent of the 
phenomenological approach and has an important place in that school of thought. 
The second type is Levinas‟s “Talmudic readings,” a genre unique to him in which he 
presents a philosophical reading of Talmudic passages in which the various opinions 
expressed and tested in the Talmud‟s treatment of an issue become part of our 
contemporary philosophical discourse. 
                                                           
1 E. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity : Conversations With Philippe Nemo, trans.: R. Cohen, Pittsburgh 1991, 
p. 65. 
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 The starting point for my research is the assertion that Levinas‟s philosophical 
writings and his “Talmudic readings” are constituent parts of the same endeavor – 
one that is essentially philosophical – and that, in keeping this assumption, one can 
wrest from the writings labeled “Talmudic readings” philosophical meanings that are 
not subjects of inquiry in his stringently philosophical writings.  
 Previous efforts to explore the significance of the feminine in Levinas‟s 
philosophy have focused, for the most part, on his philosophical writings.
2
 What I am 
attempting to accomplish here, then, is to demonstrate the contribution made by 
Levinas‟s “Talmudic readings” to his philosophical treatment of women and the 
feminine.
3
 
 
Sexual Difference 
Ethics, which Levinas bases upon a primary metaphysical imperative, rests upon the 
consciousness of the self and an awareness of the otherness of another human 
being. This otherness cannot be identified with what “resembles” it in the self. 
Therefore Levinas invests considerable energy in describing the phenomena in which 
the intrusion of the otherness of another human being into the self occurs.
4
 
It appears that among Levinas‟s descriptions, one particular intrusion of 
consciousness stands out as undeniable: being addressed by the other gender – in 
Levinas‟s context as a man, the woman as Other. An encounter with a woman is the 
intrusion of an otherness that cannot be subsumed under or included by the male 
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 In her recently published book, Levinas, Judaism, and the Feminine (Bloomington-Indianapolis 2003), 
Claire Elise Katz offers a similar approach to integrating Levinas‟s writings on Jewish themes into our 
understanding of his views of the feminine. While Katz focuses her attention on Levinas‟s treatment of 
Biblical narratives, with occasional reference to their exegesis in rabbinic midrash, this study explores 
Levinas‟s Talmudic readings, which are particularly rich in material that complements Levinas‟s more 
strictly philosophical work on our theme and others. 
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 Levinas devotes a great deal of phenomenological writing to this topic, especially in his Totality and 
Infinity, transl. A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: 1969. See, for example: “Freedom Called into Question” )pp. 82-
84(, “Separation as Life” )109-121(, “Enjoyment and Separation” )147-151, “Sensibility and the Face” 
(187-193). 
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consciousness. From the male‟s perspective, she is clearly different. She is not him. 
This refers first of all to the more physical aspects of being, even before any attempt 
to identify unique characteristics of the feminine, if indeed these exist. An encounter 
of this sort is described in the writings of the French psychoanalyst Ida Feinberg and 
her Israeli colleague Yolanda Gampel as one of three narcissistic injuries 
experienced by every person. The fact that a person has a particular, identifiable 
gender, making that person a man or a woman but not both, strikes at the individual‟s 
primary narcissistic perception.
5
 
Levinas identifies otherness of gender as an otherness that is not subject to Husserlian 
Reduction. On this point one can perceive a criticism of Husserl for not having 
approached woman with sufficient seriousness in his attempt to solve the problem of 
―experience of the other,‖ the mode of presentation of the other as a different subject. 
That experience serves also as the test of the phenomenological reduction that Husserl 
performs6.  
 It would appear that, had Husserl taken the female subject seriously as a 
subject, the difference of gender would have overcome the attempt at reduction, and 
we would have found ourselves with an entire field or fields that Levinas labels 
“irreducible.” The reason, according to Levinas, is that from the perspective of a 
man‟s concepts, woman is irreducible. She is the “absolute Other.”
7
 
"What is the alterity that does not purely and simply enter into the opposition 
of two species of the same genus? I think the absolutely contrary contrary [le 
contraire contraire absolutement contraire], whose contrariety is in no way 
affected by the relationship that can be established between it and its 
correlative, the contrariety that permits its terms to remain absolutely other, is 
the feminine”. 8 
The otherness of woman is the otherness that cannot be overcome. In this context, 
Levinas is attacking the view that speaks of the relations between a man and a 
woman as two complementary halves of a whole, since complementarity assumes a 
priori an identification of the other with the self and does not admit the possibility that 
the other may represent absolute otherness. Therefore it is important for him to point 
                                                           
5
 The other two narcissitic injuries are: the fact that a person does not facilitate his own birth, and the 
fact that he is eventually going to pass over into death. 
6
 E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans.: D. Cairns, The Hague, 1960, pp. 110 – 111.  
7
 Of course, Levinas includes this thought, about the impossibility of reduction vis-à-vis any other 
individual, since an essential quality of otherness is that it cannot be reduced into the self‟s concepts of 
consciousness. Nonetheless, feminine otherness stands out inasmuch as gender difference does not 
make it possible for its bearer to identify with the sexual uniqueness of a man. 
8
 Levinas, Time and the Other, trans.: R. Cohen, Pittsburgh 1987, p. 85. 
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out that this relation does not become a perfect whole but is an “insurmountable 
duality”: 
―Neither is the difference between the sexes the duality of two complementary terms, 
for two complementary terms presuppose a preexisting whole. To say that sexual 
duality presupposes a whole is to posit love beforehand as fusion. The pathos of love, 
however, consists in an insurmountable duality of beings. It is a relationship with 
what always slips away. The relationship does not ipso facto neutralize alterity but 
preserve it. The pathos of voluptuousness lies in the fact of being two. The other as 
other is not here an object that becomes ours or becomes us; to the contrary, it 
withdraws into its mystery. Neither does this mystery of the feminine – the feminine: 
essentially other – refer to any romantic notions of the mysterious, unknown, or 
misunderstood woman‖ 9.  
Two stances may be identified regarding the meaning of woman‟s otherness. The 
first speaks of woman‟s difference from man as an otherness that cannot be 
successfully grappled with by man. Woman, in her differentness, and first and 
foremost her sexual difference, puts man in a position that cannot be synthesized 
within the “identical” )le même(. She is not similar to the male‟s concepts, and she 
forces him to come to grips with difference and otherness. In this sense, we could 
offer a similar description for woman of the differentness of man, whose sexual 
difference cannot be subsumed under the female concept of sexuality
10
. 
The second stance, which will be developed below, ascribes an essential ―otherness‖ 
to woman. The feminine includes within itself a dimension of ―Other‖ or 
―Otherness.‖11 
The centrality of gender difference in Levinas‟s thought seems already to emerge 
from the very title of the “Talmudic reading” that Levinas dedicated to our topic: “And 
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 Time and the Other, p. 86   
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 P. Kayser, Emmanuel Lévinas: la trace du feminine, Paris 2000. Kayser‟s analysis of Levinas‟s 
concept of the differences between the sexes leads her to a critical stance toward what she sees as his 
use of the feminine as representation rather than as actual being. (See pp. 30-34.) 
11
 This term requires clarification, of course: what is that otherness ascribed by Levinas to woman, 
which is an essential otherness and not, as with man, something external? This issue will be clarified in 
the context of the discussion of the characteristics of the feminine according to Levinas, which is the 
main substance of this article. 
 5 
God Created Woman.”
12
 This title appears to take issue with the view, apparently 
biblical, in which the male enjoys preferential status and priority, stemming from 
man‟s ontological primacy vis-à-vis woman. Levinas titles his article in such a way as 
to argue from the start that woman is an independent creation. Woman is not a 
creature derived from man, the product of his “deep sleep,” and thus her status is not 
one of subjugation or secondariness relative to man but that of an independent 
product of Creation. This point of view is of great significance in the presentation of 
femininity and masculinity, of man and woman, as two creations ontologically 
different from one another: 
―The creation of man was the creation of two beings in one but two beings equal in 
dignity: difference and sexual relations belong to the fundamental content of what is 
human‖13. 
Man and woman gain expression as distinct creatures, with neither taking 
precedence in time or status but with their difference from each other expressing a 
primary otherness. The gender difference is not a marginal distinction subsumed 
under the human, but rather a central component of the human phenomenon
14
. 
 
The creation of woman separately from man underscores man‘s position in his inner world, 
which is not subject to generalization or to categorization. Woman is not something man 
understands from within himself; she is the absolute Other. And as such she is not subject to 
reduction. 
Man and Woman – Equality of Status  
 
One of the most important topics in feminist discourse is the dignity of women in 
society. Western culture established a stable distinction of status between men and 
women, facilitating discrimination. 15 As Levinas said of Jewish culture:      
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 Levinas, “And God Created Woman”, Nine Talmudic Readings, trans.: A. Aaronovitz, Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: 1990, 161-177 ; the other Talmudic reading dedicated to this subject is “Judaism and 
the Feminine”, Difficult Freedom, trans.: S. Hand, Baltimore 1990, pp. 30 – 38 
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 “And God Created Woman,” p. 169. 
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 “Judaism and the Feminine,” p. 34. 
15
 There is a wide feminist writings on this issue, so here will found only few important references: E. 
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The Woman that Never Evolved, Cambridge 1981 ; Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, 
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 ―We are far from the conditions prevailing in the Orient where, at the 
heart of a masculine civilization, woman finds herself completely 
subordinate to masculine whims or reduced to charming or lightening 
the harsh life of men.‖16 
 
Levinas places the question of women‘s equality as a secondary question to the principal one, 
that of the human duality. This position leads him to interpret the Talmudic phrase ―God 
created two countenances in the first man‖ differently from the traditional commentaries.  
Rashi for example interpreted the phrase:  
―Two countenances – He made him at first with two faces, one in front 
and one in back, and split him in two and made Eve out of one,‖ 17  
 
For Levinas the problem of duality preceded the differentiation of two genders. This duality is 
not sexual at first but the human situation beyond gender. The duality is situated in the ability 
of humans to choose, in the sense of the human being as a creature endowed with 
knowledge.18 This duality is founded in the breach between natural impulses and moral 
imperatives.19 This is the duality between the outside – everything that calls a person to 
responsibility20 -- and the inside.  
The image of the double faces describes the interior duality of the human being. There is no 
possibility for the illusion of completeness of the person, because the division is primary. In 
Levinas‘s view, the Talmud treats the feminine and gender in keeping with its social ethics. 
The sexual differentiation is subordinate to the social differentiation,21  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity, ed. by G. Bock and S. James, New York 1992 ; Imaging 
Women: Cultural Representations and Gender, F. Bonner (ed.), Cambridge 1992 ; The Feminist 
Reader, C. Belsey & J. Moore (eds.), New York 1989 ; M. French, Beyond Power: On Women, Men and 
Morals, New York 1985. 
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 “Judaism and the Feminine,” p. 31. 
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 Rashi on Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 61a.  
18
 “The Holy One, Blessed is He, created man with two inclinations, one a good inclination and the other 
an evil inclination” )Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 61a(. 
19
 “Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said: Woe to me from my Creator, and woe to me from my inclination” )idem, 
61a).  
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In the interpretation of the Tamudic passage, Levinas focuses on a dispute between the 
Babylonian sages Rav and Shmuel on the identification of the organ that God took to create 
Eve in Genesis22. This dispute deals with the question of women‘s status. For the Talmud 
there are two optional physical locations for this organ, the tail and the face: 
― ‗And the tsela which the Lord had taken from man made he a woman‘ 
-- Rav and Samuel explained this differently. One said that it was a 
face, the other said that it was a tail‖.23 
 
The interpretive instinct may lead the skilled reader to think that the tail expresses a 
diminished status for women. Levinas surprises us when he attributes greater gender equality 
to the opinion that sees this organ as a tail. He points out that the tail is not an essential part of 
the human body. Saying that Eve was created from the tail reduces the dependence of women 
on men. A new creation is necessary for the woman, just as it was for the man. Furthermore, 
perhaps the man is the first in the biblical story, but as long as there is no woman there is no 
meaning to his masculinity. When there is a meaning to gender, we can see that woman is 
God‘s creature just as man is.24     
 
In this context it is possible to see the ―tail‖ interpretation as a subordination of gender to the 
definition of a human being. To be a female is something additional to the humanness of the 
woman. She is a person and above that she has the additional characteristic of being a woman:  
 ―They have other things to do besides cooing, and moreover, 
something else to do and more, than limit themselves to the relations 
that are established because of the differences in sex.‖25  
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 “R. Yirmiyah ben Elazar said: The Holy One Blessed is He, created two figures [or: faces] in the first 
man [Adam], as it says: [From the] back and the front You have formed me” )idem, 61a(. 
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 The private problem is a political problem.  
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 See Kayser‟s discussion of the term vayyitzer in Emmanuel Lévinas: la trace du feminine, pp. 52-59, 
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 Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 61a. 
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 Levinas, “And God Created Woman,” p. 169. The reference to Freud is very clear, with the important 
emphasis to the limitation of sexuality in creating culture, even there is a price –  guilt and guilt feelings.   
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This explanation could have been accepted by Levinas. He prefers however to speak about 
sexual difference as a fundamental difference that is essential to what constructs the person as 
a person. A small remark of Levinas, one that may seem very naive, is significant in this 
context:  
 ―As I see it, this is what my text shows. I am not taking sides, today, I 
am commenting‖26. 
 
Levinas chooses to describe the ―tail‖ interpretation as a possible reading in the Talmud, 
which, although he disagrees with it, he could see as an important position. The reason is that 
this position is very important in feminist thought, when seeing the question of equality as the 
central topic of feminism. This may be Simone de Bouvoir‘s central point in her book, The 
Second Sex.27 In de Beauvoir‘s view, women are subordinated to men because of women‘s 
physical weakness as expressed in pregnancy. The only way to preserve social equality is by 
giving up pregnancy.  
Levinas actually prefers the contrasting interpretation, that the organ was a face, which views 
the masculine and the feminine as primary characteristics.     
Levinas‘s remark can be understood in this manner: this first position (tail) is legitimate and 
also has important advantages, but I, Levinas, do not prefer it. The reason is that the 
difference between men and women is essential.   
 
A close reading of Levinas indicates that he prefers the interpretation according to which the 
woman is created from a face. In this reading, the first human being is shaped as two attached 
beings of equivalent status, but despite their equality they are two different beings. Gender, 
which is an expression of this difference, is not something that is subordinate to the definition 
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 “And God Created Woman,” p. 170. 
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 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans.: H.M. Parshley, London 1960. 
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of the human being but part of this definition. Sexuality is part of what defines a human 
being.  
 
Rabbinical thought, according to Levinas, employs the Platonic myth about the ancient 
creature made of a man and a woman joined together. For Plato this is the origin of sexual 
attraction:  
―For though ‗hermaphrodite‘ is only used nowadays as a term of 
contempt, there really was a man-woman in those days, a being which 
was half male and half female. [...] Each of these beings was globular in 
shape, with rounded back and sides, four arms and four legs, and two 
faces, both the same [...]  
So saying, he cut them all in half just as you or I might chop up some 
apples for pickling, or slice an egg with hair. [...]  
Now, when the work of bisection was complete it left each half with a 
desperate yearning for the other, and they ran together and flung their 
arms around each other‘s necks, and asked for nothing better than to be 
rolled into one. [...]  
So you see, gentlemen, how far back we can trace our innate love for 
one another, and how this love is always trying to reintegrate our 
former nature, to make two into one, and to bridge the gulf between one 
human being and another‖28.    
 
The rabbinical position is markedly different. It sees the separate as preferable to the united. 
Difference is preferable to harmony. For the Rabbis this ancient creature was in internal 
conflict over the issue of which side would lead:   
 ―Was this rib not a side of Adam, created as a single being with two 
faces that God separated while Adam, still androgynous, was sleeping? 
This theme perhaps evolved from Plato‘s Symposium, but it is one 
which in the Doctors takes on a new meaning. The two faces of the 
primitive Adam from the beginning look towards the side to which they 
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 Plato, Symposium, trans.: M. Joyce, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, E. Hemilton & H. Cairns (eds.), 
Princeton 1989, pp. 542 – 544 [pp. 189 – 192]. 
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will always remain turned […] For the Jews, separated existence will be 
worth more than the initial union‖29. 
Equality as Ignoring the Feminine 
 
Levinas expresses concern that social equality comes at the price of denial of the feminine. 
While the position of equality seems more worthy both legally and publicly, for Levinas it is 
important first to state the importance of differentiation of gender, and only then to 
understand the place of the woman as a woman in the public space.  
 
Levinas raises the problematic character of this position in a surprising context: the 
phenomenon of secularity and the de-mystification it entails.30 Levinas interprets a talmudic 
passage on the topic of sorcery. The Talmud questions the feminine language of the biblical 
verses in this topic: mekhashefot, witches. Is the Bible attributing sorcerers‘ powers 
particularly to women? Can one also find men who are involved in this kind of act?   
Levinas wonders whether this language stems mainly from historical reasons, as some would 
claim: that is, the majority of sorcerers were women. According to this explanation this mode 
of speech expresses historical facts and not anything essential. 
But Levinas argues against taking this text literally; there is something beyond it. The Talmud 
does not intend to draw a comparison between women and sorcerers, and then to suspect 
every woman of sorcery. Levinas supports this argument with the biblical descriptions of 
women such as Rebecca and Sarah. There are no verses that describe them as sorcerers.  
Levinas focuses on the erotic dimension of the relationship between men and women. He 
notes the ambiguity related to the erotic phenomenon: the mystery, the revealed and the 
concealed. This ambiguity brings into the relationship between men and women a dimension 
of ―forgery‘ that Levinas calls ‗sorcery.‖ It is not a concrete act, but the sexual seduction 
usually related to the feminine.   
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 “Judaism and the Feminine,” p. 35 
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 Désacralisation et désensorcellement,” Du sacré au saint, Paris 1977, pp. 82 – 121, especially pp. 91 
- 93.  
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Levinas next asks: why is it necessary to distinguish between masculine and feminine? This 
question applies to the Talmudic text, but we can turn it on Levinas himself. Is the feminine 
dimension possible when we only dealing with women‘s emancipation, women‘s freedom, 
and their entrance to the public space? Is the social sensitivity of not separating between men 
and women real emancipation? The fact that men formed the ―general‖ dimension, that men 
created the meaning of the universal, led Levinas to ask this question: Can we talk about 
equal status when women join in the masculine context? Or is it possible to talk about 
equality only when women enter the public space as women? 
Characteristics of the Feminine  
 
The significance of the argument that the distinction of gender between man and woman is 
primary is that of necessity it raises the question: what is the meaning of this distinction?  
 
In his strictly philosophical writing, Levinas characterizes the feminine in several ways: the 
feminine as connected to the dimension of future time; a different direction of the motion of 
transcendence, directed inward; the characteristic of domesticity; the phenomenon of 
pregnancy and maternity; the phenomenon of the erotic. In his Talmudic writing, Levinas 
focuses on only two characteristics that are the starting point for thinking about the feminine: 
first, that of pregnancy and its ethical and philosophical concomitants and, second, the 
phenomenon of eros and its ethical concomitants.  
 
These two phenomena are raised by Levinas in his Talmudic reading, ―And God Created 
Woman‖,31 as two uniquely feminine characteristics related to the midrash on the word 
vayyiven in Genesis 2:22: ―And the Lord God fashioned the rib that He had taken from the 
man into a woman….‖. The Talmud offers two characterizations of this feminine 
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 “And God Created Woman,” p. 174 
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construction. One characterization, that of beautification, is explained by Levinas as a quality 
related to the erotic realm of male-female interaction. The second, central in Levinas‘s view, 
is that of pregnancy, being a home to a gestating being. These two qualities are fundamental 
and basic in Levinas‘s philosophy, and therefore they are the basis for the other qualities.    
 
The Talmudic description of beauty is interpreted by Levinas as Eros. To the direct and 
honest relationship between men and women, sexual difference adds attention to external 
appearance. Thus the deep meaning of beauty includes a measure of ‖forgery.‖ Taking 
responsibility for this sexual difference is problematic because one approaches the female 
other not only as an other but also as a woman. One does not relate directly to the other 
person exposed before him.32 One relates to the other through the other‘s mask, or the other‘s 
Persona.  
 
Levinas raises this issue again, when the Talmud explains that it is not simple for a man to 
walk after a woman. Levinas‘ interpretation is that the meeting between man and woman is 
not simply ―one and the other‖; it is fraught with ambiguity. This meeting includes the erotic 
side, and communication between them includes the sweetness of intimacy. As if the relation 
became ―soiled‖ because of the ‖forgery.‖ Levinas expresses suspicion of the sweetness, of 
the temptation of tenderness. 
 
The second quality of the feminine in the Talmud is biological and belongs only to woman: 
pregnancy. Discussion of pregnancy has been part of feminist theories for a long time, arising 
from de Beauvoir‘s position. Pregnancy limits the ―being‖ of women as human beings, 
because it limits them to the role of mother.  
Levinas develops a philosophical observation of the phenomenon of pregnancy. He tries to 
derive from this phenomenon the meaning of motherhood and a new meaning of subjectivity.  
 13 
 
Pregnancy and its Ethical Implications 
―Another explanation: Rav Hisda said—and others said that it was 
taught in a baraita: The Torah teaches us that the Holy One, blessed be 
He, made Eve like a granary. For just as the granary is narrow at the top 
and large at the bottom to hold the harvest, so woman is narrow at the 
top and large at the bottom to hold the child,‖33 
 
Maimonides refers to pregnancy when trying to illustrate the impossible mission of 
understanding creation. He suggests imagining an orphan growing up on a deserted island, 
that in one way or another finds out the facts of pregnancy, the fact of there being a person 
within another person:  
―Now the orphaned child must of necessity put the question: Did every 
individual among us – when he was little, contained within a belly, but 
alive and moving and growing – did he eat, drink, breathe through the 
mouth and nose, produce excrements? […] Similarly all the analogies 
will be carried on in order to show that it is in no respect possible that 
man should be generated in that manner.‖34. 
 
Pregnancy is a situation in which a person contains the other within herself, at once both a 
part of her and entirely separate from her. The body‘s usual response is to reject a foreign 
body that has made its way inside it, but not in the case of pregnancy, which protects and 
sustains the stranger within. 
 
Husserl, in the ―Fifth Meditation‖ of his Cartesian Meditations, investigates the possibility of 
identifying a living body outside oneself as another person by means of the physical senses. 
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 The exposure of the face with its nakedness and its revealing is very central in Levinas‟s philosophy. 
Levinas sees the face as a non-phenomenal phenomenon that establishes the ethics from the other‟s 
face. See Levinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 187 - 219. 
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 Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 61a. 
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 Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans.: S. Pines, Chicago and London 1963, II:17, 
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The I establishes its consciousness of its own body on the basis of its awareness of its own 
ability to integrate the various senses and make one‘s own perceived body into an object. But 
the body of the other is always there as an object, and thus I cannot perceive that it is a living 
body other through the imagination, which enables me to think that the object that presents 
itself to me as a body is similar to me and is thus also alive: 
―In this Nature and in this world, my animate organism (a function 
organ), the body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an 
animate organism, must have derived this sense by an apperceptive 
transfer from my animate organism, and done so in a manner that 
excludes an actually direct, and hence primordial, showing of the 
predicates belonging to an animate organism specifically, a showing of 
them in perception proper. It is clear from the very beginning that only 
a similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body over 
there with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the 
“analogizing” apprehension of that body as another animate 
organism‖35.  
 
If Husserl had given consideration to the woman as subject and to the phenomenon of 
pregnancy, he could have found the situation of accepting the other within one‘s body and 
perforce responsibility as well for that one that is other than oneself. Levinas describes things 
that way – pregnancy as a state of being pursued by someone for whom you are responsible. 
That pained sigh, those inner sufferings that express absolute responsibility toward something 
that is other than you – this is a distinctly ethical characteristic that passes beyond itself, from 
pregnancy into the concept of maternity. The source of the image Levinas employs, ―being 
responsible for one by whom you are being pursued,‖ is the talmudic discussion of the 
response to someone pursuing another person with harmful intent. Situations may occur in 
which the fetus proves harmful to the health or survival of the mother. 
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In his book Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas develops the image of 
pregnancy as something that breaks out of every framework of consciousness, precisely when 
we consider maternity as a physical, bodily experience. The thought of maternity destroys the 
possibility of talking about relations only in an external fashion, since with pregnancy, the 
meaning of the concept is embodied. Sensitivity does not begin with awareness of the other, 
but within the body. This sensitivity includes being pursued in a very real fashion by a 
stranger, but maternity contains the paradox of wanting this being-pursued and even being 
responsible for this pursuit. This is the sigh that encompasses pregnancy, which is the result 
of being pursued by the one who is to be born or has been born. 
It should be emphasized that from Levinas‘s perspective, maternity is not just the 
phenomenon of pregnancy; it is subject to expansion into thinking about relations with an 
other that are not preceded by the consciousness of a subject: 
―It is a pre-original not resting on oneself, the restlessness of someone 
persecuted – Where to be? How to be? It is a writhing in the tight 
dimension of pain, the unsuspected dimension of the rejection into the 
negative, behind nothingness; it is maternity, gestation of the other in 
the same. Is not the restlessness of someone persecuted but a 
modification of maternity, the groaning of the wounded entrails by 
those it will bear or has borne? In maternity what signifies is a 
responsibility for others, to the point of substitution for others and 
suffering both from the effect of persecution itself in which the 
persecutor sinks. Maternity, which is bearing par excellence, bears even 
the responsibility for the persecuting by the persecutor‖36. 
 
The circles of maternal responsibility are deep, because they contain an irrevocable 
responsibility for and to the person who is one‘s difficulty37. 
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But this is not enough for Levinas, since maternity is not just this guarantee but a reminder of 
the ―immemorial memory‖ of the self. Levinas appears here to touch upon the I‘s difficulty 
with assuming itself as a certainty and as a basis for consciousness, with pregnancy being a 
reminder to the individual of his or her own having once been born. Whoever is born cannot 
be a source of certainty or of primacy. A born being is not a basis for full consciousness or 
one who establishes a world. 
―Maternity is the complete being ‗for the other‘ which characterized it, 
which is the very signifyingness of signification, is the ultimate sense of 
this vulnerability. This hither side of identity is not reducible to the for-
itself. Where, beyond its immediate identity, being recognizes itself in 
its difference,‖38 
 
Maternity, then, is a surprising, fascinating phenomenon that takes in all the necessary 
dimensions of being for an Other. It attains significance by making a meaning other than itself 
possible. It receives its identity not by virtue of being for itself but by virtue of being for 
another. 
 
The centrality of the phenomenon of a woman‘s pregnancy is noted within feminist thought 
as well, as a major point of contention. There have been those who view pregnancy as a crisis 
and the choice of maternity as a woman‘s becoming weaker and more vulnerable, dependent 
upon a man and thus having a lower social status. Therefore, in Simone de Beauvoir‘s 
suggestion,39 each woman has the choice of opting either for maternity or for human equality. 
One is not born a woman; one becomes a woman. 
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In a more refined fashion, we can discern a similar description of maternity in the writing of 
Sara Ruddick.40 In her view, the practicalities of maternity direct the mother into relinquishing 
part of her power for the benefit of her children. Maternal thinking41 is unique by virtue of its 
being a consciousness directed toward the other and relating to others as free subjects.42 
Ruddick – and there is a certain parallel with Levinas – thus calls for integrating the maternal 
voice into political discourse. Maternal thinking in public discourse would include a pacifist 
dimension, protecting life, and would stand opposite male thinking, which is based on 
militarism and destruction and is therefore an element of death. 
 
In another place,43 Levinas directs the reader to the connection between thought about God 
and pregnancy, between God and the womb. In rabbinic parlance, God is sometimes called 
Rakhmana, ―The Merciful One,‖ derived from the Aramaic term for ―love,‖ whose root letters 
(r-h-m) are the same as those the Hebrew term for ―womb,‖ rekhem. That divine epithet, then, 
can be seen to derive from relating to God as a uterus.  
―Rakhamim is the relation of the other, whose gestation takes place 
within it. Rakhamim is maternity itself.‖44 
 
The idea of divinity as womb is one that makes it possible to describe God‘s infinite nature as 
an openness to different possibilities, an openness to a future time that will arrive by human 
agency. The womb as the possibility of containment, the ability of opening up to the other, is 
a distinctly feminine phenomenon. 
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―God as merciful is God defined by maternity. A feminine element is 
stirred in the depth of this mercy. This maternal element in divine 
paternity is very remarkable.‖45 
 
Levinas sees pregnancy as something that sets the feminine apart as unique. Furthermore, the 
phenomenon of pregnancy has social significance and moral implications. Not only must 
there be recognition of the importance of the private sphere as private, as it is expressed in 
pregnancy and childbirth, but pregnancy as a phenomenon has social and moral implications. 
 
From an examination of the phenomenon of pregnancy Levinas wants to infer the concept of 
maternity, and from it the concept of fatherhood and of parenthood in general, as a key 
concept for understanding responsibility toward the other, even at the price of having the 
other do something injurious to oneself. This is a form of welcoming, of hospitality, in his 
words, that goes beyond the limits of alienated encounter. 
 
Maternity and the Meaning of Dwelling 
 
A concept derived from the phenomenon of pregnancy is that of domesticity, which 
constitutes a development of thought about pregnancy. Levinas grants thought about 
―dwelling‖ a separate place and a distinguished status. 
In his book Totality and Infinity, Levinas discusses the concept of dwelling. In the 
philosophical context, it appears that this part of the discussion is directed polemically at 
Heidegger. The source of the discussion of domesticity, though, is not in Freudian ―angst‖46 
or Heideggerian ―thrownness― [geworfen]: ―he does not find himself brutally cast forth and 
forsaken in the world.‖47  The source is in the Talmudic context, where we find this: 
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 ―[…] In a world that offers it no inner refuge, in which it is 
disorientated, solitary and wandering […] ―The house is woman‖ the 
Talmud tells us.‖48 
 
This relating of woman to the home occurs many times in the Talmud.49 In Talmudic 
Aramaic, we find the term debitu for ―woman,‖ a term that may connect woman to the home 
(Hebrew bayit), because it can be interpreted as ―[the one] located in the house.‖50 In 
Levinas‘s parlance, the term ―home‖ or domesticity goes beyond the descriptive social usage 
of the term, extending it even to the meaning of ―being in the world.‖ 
Characterizing woman as ―home‖ may sound derisive, viewing the woman as home to the 
man, who goes out into the world. The passage about the ideal wife in Proverbs 31 can be 
understood this way, with the woman providing assistance and support for her man. The dual 
term for Eve as Adam‘s ―help meet for him‖ (`ezer ke-negdo) in Genesis 2 also lends itself to 
such an image. 
 
Levinas‘s concept of woman as home, though, runs deeper than that and indeed stands in 
contrast to Heidegger. Heidegger describes the situation of the Dasein’s being as ―thrown into 
the world.‖ Authenticity lies in accepting the facticity of this fact. Levinas uses a difficult 
metaphor to describe this facticity, that of an actual projectile, a ―stone one casts behind 
oneself.‖51 Opposite the possibility of projectedness is ―home-ness/dwelling.‖  
 
One possible perception of ―home‖ would describe it as a person‘s protected space, a 
deliberate turning away from the external and a gathering inward into one‘s interior. Levinas 
considers this a male perception. There is another possibility for understanding ―home,‖ one 
that Levinas identifies with the feminine. This is home not as shelter but as ―dwelling,‖ a 
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home that is domesticity intended to welcome, one that remains open in order to accept 
guests. The male world is alienated, says Levinas, industrial fabrication offers progress and 
technology – of an alienated sort. Woman offers an alternative in an alienated world, an 
alternative called ―home.‖ We know the phrase ―to feel at home.‖ Its meaning is not to ―to 
feel protected‖ but rather to feel that one is moving inward to a familiar place, a welcoming 
place. It is a motion of transition – not an outward one, though, but an inward one.52  
 
Levinas cites in this context two Talmudic descriptions. One delicately describes, in a 
somewhat fanciful reading of the verses in Genesis preceding the creation of Eve, how Adam 
―copulated [or: attempted to copulate] with every wild animal and beast.‖ Looking for a 
sexual partner, Adam first tried out all the animals, but he knew he had not found the right 
partner until he met Eve. An odd and vulgar story, it would seem. Levinas takes it to mean 
that woman is not an answer to a need, woman is not a sexual response to man‘s needs. At 
that level, man resembles every other animal, and at that level he can find his sexual 
fulfillment, or a response to his sexual needs, his need for sexual pleasure, even without being 
dependent on a woman. What woman offers man is something not sexual, or beyond sexuality 
– dwelling, motion in another direction. Levinas is looking to describe as vividly as possible, 
although in modest language, the vagina as home. But this home is welcoming, it turns an 
outward movement into an inward movement. It makes a movement of alienation into a 
movement of intimacy. Woman not only solves the mythical Adam‘s problem of loneliness 
but she grants him ―peace‖ in the sense of undoing his sense of alienation from the world. 
 
The second Talmudic description continues the discussion with another midrash embellishing 
a biblical story. Rabbi Yose met the prophet Elijah and took that opportunity to ask him the 
meaning of the biblical phrase mentioned above, `ezer ke-negdo (literally, ―a help opposite 
him‖). Elijah‘s answer is roughly this: man brings home wheat, but can he eat wheat? A man 
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brings home flax, but can he wear flax? Woman turns the flax into clothing and the wheat into 
bread. 
 
Levinas examines the two characteristics that the Rabbis ascribe to woman through Elijah. 
Wheat and flax are tools that man produces. He has separated from nature, overcome nature, 
and learned to produce in agriculture. What is odd about Elijah‘s answer is the need for 
woman to process the wheat into bread. Wouldn‘t a mere helper, or to put it bluntly, a servant, 
have been sufficient? Rather, says Levinas, the meaning of Elijah‘s response is in the reversal 
of movement. If the male‘s movement is the conquest of nature for the sake of his needs, the 
female offers the opposite movement, homeward, of the clothing and the bread. Making 
wheat into bread is certainly one of the symbols of domestic sensibility. 
 
Male civilization is a civilization of conquest, if not of a common enemy then of nature. 
Female civilization is a civilization of humaneness, of domesticity, of ―peace,‖ a civilization 
of ethics. In the terms Levinas uses in this context, borrowed from the Talmud, feminine 
civilization grants ―blessing‖ and ―joy‖ and gives ―light.‖53 
―To light eyes that are blind, to restore to equilibrium, and so to 
overcome an alienation which ultimately results from the very virility of 
the universal and all-conquering logos that stalks the very shadows that 
could have sheltered it, should be the ontological function of the 
feminine‖54. 
 
From Levinas‘s perspective, this topic already instructs us about the connection, which will 
become very significant in Levinas‘s thought, between the feminine and the future. 
In his book, Time and the Other, Levinas grapples with the meaning of future time.55 For him, 
the future will be an entry of that which is beyond time into the present in such a way as to 
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command in him responsibility that is open to the other. This is the nature of messianic 
consciousness for him, but the feminine dimension is such as well. 
 
The future exists within the feminine itself as that which does not attempt to conquer in an 
outward direction. It makes coming events possible, the future that does not seek to become 
the present but instead one that has not yet arrived. The actual expression of this is the manner 
of greeting, of welcoming guests, described above, which makes it possible to accept anyone 
who comes and does not know who might arrive or when.56 
 
To put it in different terms, what is described by Levinas is the messianic future, the one that 
will come without my knowing when, the one that comes to me from another person and 
commands me to accept a moral mission directed toward the future. 
The Phenomenon of Eros 
 
The phenomenon of Eros is not unconnected to the phenomenon of pregnancy, but it 
nevertheless extends beyond it, not in an inward motion but in outward motion. The erotic 
realm brings us before two additional characteristics of the feminine, in Levinas‘s view: 
―future time‖ and a different direction of movement of transcendence. 
 
The dimension of future time exists within the feminine in the way that erotic tension exists 
between a man and a woman. Eros is always a thing of the future, not only in that it makes 
childbirth possible, being the existence of what does not yet exist in the available present, but 
also in that in eroticism something always slips away from us, always eludes our perception. 
Thus Levinas prefers to describe the erotic by the phenomenon of the caress:  
―The caress is a mode of the subject‘s being, where the subject who is 
in contact with another goes beyond this contact. Contact as sensation is 
part of the world of light. But what is caressed is not touched, properly 
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speaking. It is not the softness or warmth of the hand given in contact 
that the caress seeks. The seeking of the caress constitutes its essence 
by the fact that the caress does not know what it seeks. This ―not 
knowing,‖ this fundamental disorder, is the essential. It is like a game 
with something slipping away, a game absolutely without project or 
plan, not with what can become ours or us, but with something other, 
always other, always inaccessible, and always still to come [à venir]. 
The caress is the anticipation of this pure future [avenir], without 
content. It is made up of this increase of hunger, of ever richer 
promises, opening new perspectives onto the ungraspable. It feeds on 
countless hungers‖57. 
 
Like the feminine itself, so messianism is anticipation, hope for a future not yet arrived, 
unknown, that opens up possibilities but does not make them into ―being.‖ It is always future, 
always not yet. Anticipation and openness to the possible are part of both the feminine and the 
messianic. The intrusion of the future into the present as an as-yet-unrealized, unknown future 
is essential to the phenomenon of the feminine in Levinas. Thus the feminine becomes the 
motive force of messianism, not as that which is hidden within the available present but as 
that which is not present there. 
―Woman is the category of future, the ecstasy of future. It is that human 
possibility which consists in saying that the life of another human being 
is more important than my own, that the Other comes before me, that 
the value of the Other is asserted before my own. 
In the future, there is what might happen to me. And there is also my 
death.‖58  
 
Levinas connects woman, future, and messianism under the metaphor of changes along ―the 
messianic train on the actual path of sacred history.‖59 The train of messianic history would be 
in danger, as it were, of jumping the track, were it not for feminine supervision and alertness. 
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The description of the messianic train of history implies determinism, with the tracks 
determining the path it takes. But such a determinism is the very opposite of messianism, and 
thus the ones who can rescue messianism are women, or femininity. It is femininity that is 
able to face a future that does not arrive and extract the present from being forever ―stuck‖ in 
the existing situation. This may be the deeper meaning if the expression ―sacred history‖ for 
Levinas.60  
 
Whithout spelling out his intent, Levinas directs our attention to the biblical Miriam, who 
brings a wetnurse for her brother Moses, and according to midrashic legends, it is Miriam 
who brought about the birth of Moses, the instrument of redemption.61 He also directs our 
attention to Tamar, who made it possible for Peretz and Zerach to be born and thus, down the 
line, King David.62 These situations and others described in the Torah are always at the edge 
of the visible.63 This is no accident, says Levinas, since the feminine is at the edge of the 
visible. The feminine is not the revealed world but precisely the inner world that is not 
present, and this gives rise to its openness to the future, to what is yet to come. It is precisely 
the ability to sustain a domain that is not public that makes it possible to effect change in the 
public domain – what we call ―history.‖ Openess to the other can redirect history and thus 
convert it into ―sacred history.‖  
 
The encounter with the masculine concept of the future, as described by Levinas, may take 
place in the present, in the form of suspicion toward the other person who approaches me.64 
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The feminine concept of the future can be optimistic, since it is open to the possibility of a 
future that will become present, in the same way as an absence may become a presence. 
The Ambiguity of the Erotic  
 
One can go beyond the Talmudic understanding of the erotic phenomenon, as Levinas did in 
‗Phenomenology of Eros.‖65 The erotic is directed from the one to the other, not as a mode of 
revealing the other but as a mode of relationship with something secret. The erotic always is 
always directed toward ―not yet,‖ so it is always hidden: 
―The essentially hidden thrown itself toward the light, without 
becoming signification. Not nothingness – but what is not yet.‖ 66 
―‘Being not yet‘ is not a this or a that; clandestinity exhausts the 
essence of this non-essence.‖ 67  
 
Eroticism is a phenomenon that is defined not by its essence, but by its non-essence. One 
cannot understand the phenomenon of eroticism if he does not realize it is ambiguous. The 
erotic event is simultaneously secrecy and exposure, modesty and licentiousness, presentness 
and absence of nudity. Levinas calls this ambiguity ―femininity:‖   
―The simultaneity or the equivocation of this fragility and this weight of 
non-signifyingness [non-significance], heavier than the weight of the 
formless real, we shall term femininity.‖ 68  
 
The erotic is not a biological or physiological event, and it is not the ―face‖ that someone 
meets. As previously mentioned, the complete expression of eroticism is the caress. The 
caress is not a clear body gesture, but always ―not yet‖ – directed to the future. The 
occurrence of the erotic event is not revealing the hidden, but precisely the revealing of being 
hidden.    
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―Voluptuosity [...] discovers the hidden as hidden.‖ 69 
 
Contrary to popular descriptions, the actualization of the erotic does not in any way mean 
exposing. Hiding is not revealed, night is not illuminated, mystery is not removed:  
―To discover here means to violate, rather than to disclose a secret [...]. 
The erotic nudity says the inexpressible, but the inexpressible is not 
separable from a clear speech that seeks to circumscribe it [...]   
In this sense voluptuosity is a pure experience, an experience which 
does not pass into any concept, which remains blindly experience. 
Profanation, the revelation of the hidden as hidden, constitutes a model 
of being irreducible to intentionality, which is objectifying even in 
praxis, for not taking leave of ‗numbers and beings.‘‖70     
 
Levinas describes this dimension of the hidden as separate from words or emptied of words. 
The beloved becomes embodied, in a way that exposes it to ―being,‖ to the il-y-a:  
―The beloved, returned to the stage of infancy without responsibility – 
this coquettish head, this youth, this pure life ―a bit silly‖ – has quit her 
status as a person. The face fades, and in its impersonal and 
inexpressive neutrality is prolonged, in ambiguity, into animality. The 
relations with the Other are enacted in play; one plays with the Other as 
with a young animal.‖ 71 
 
Levinas has been criticized harshly for his metaphor in this paragraph72. The criticism focuses 
on the passive role that he relates to the woman:  
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―This description of pleasure given by Levinas is unacceptable to the 
extent that it presents man as the sole subject exercising his desire and 
his appetite upon the woman who is deprived of subjectivity except to 
seduce him… In my opinion, if there us a fall, it is located in the 
reduction of the feminine to the passive, to the past tense, and to the 
object of man‘s pleasure, in the identification of the woman with the 
beloved.‖73 
  
It is important to remark on the beastly dimension of which Levinas speaks – not as a relation 
to another subject but as an erotic relation. The erotic connection empties words, because one 
waives the option of revealing in favor of leaving the hidden hidden. Exposure, in the sense of 
nudity, does not expose the Other before oneself.  
 
The erotic proceeds beyond the face. We are not dealing here with the face as a mask, but 
with ―the face of the face:‖  
―The hidden – never hidden enough – is beyond the personal and as its 
reverse, refractory to the light, a category exterior to the play of being 
and nothingness, beyond the possible, for absolutely ungraspable. Its 
way beyond the possible is manifested in the non-sociality of the 
society of lovers, their refusal to give themselves over in the midst of 
their abandon, this refusal to surrender themselves that constitutes 
voluptuosity, fed by its own hungers, approaching, in vertigo, the 
hidden r the feminine, a non-personal, but into which the personal will 
not be engulfed.‖ 74 
 
Is the Feminine in Levinas’s Thought Exclusive to Women? 
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At this point, a question arises to which it is difficult to find an definitive answer in Levinas‘s 
works: does his outlook permit feminine thinking to be found among men, or among people 
simply as people? More radically, we might ask: does Levinas‘s thought in some way 
constitute a form of feminine thought? In her book Figures du feminine, Catherine Chalier 
questions whether Levinas addresses woman as a metaphor or as a real person.75  
 
Is it possible to view Levinas‘s phenomenology of the feminine as an example – even a 
central example -- of his ethical thinking? May we regard his description of the feminine as 
itself feminine thought?   
   
A fascinating parallel to Levinas in this respect can be found in the work of Carol Gilligan as 
reflected in her book, In a Different Voice.76 This parallel between their positions may assist 
us in answering our question. 
 
Gilligan describes two modes of moral reasoning, one masculine and one feminine. 
Masculine morality is based on consciousness of the self and of the rights of the individual. It 
forms the foundation of the ability to make ethical decisions that are the result of a 
confrontation between different wills, different rights. It resembles the scale proposed by 
Lawrence Kohlberg. Feminine morality, on the other hand, is based on empathy, concern, and 
responsibility toward others. 
Feminine moral reasoning is different. In Gilligan‘s words:  
―The morality of rights differs from the morality of responsibility in its 
emphasis on separation rather than connection, in its consideration of 
the individual rather than the relationship as primacy.‖77   
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Levinas describes the otherness of femininity in a similar fashion, as something unlike the 
masculine attitude toward otherness. Masculine otherness is always external, outside the 
person. It is externality, and yet:  
―[…] This feminine alterity does not consist in the object‘s simple 
exteriority. Neither is it made up of an opposition of wills.‖78 
 
The different mode of decision-making is based on her observations of differences between 
men and women in the perception of human relations:  
―Consequently, relationship, and particularly issues of dependency, are 
experienced differently by women and men. For boys and men, 
separation and individuation are critically tied to gender identity since 
separation from the mother is essential for the development of 
masculinity. For girls and women, issues of femininity or feminine 
identity do not depend on the achievement of separation from the 
mother or on the progress of individuation. Since masculinity is defined 
through separation while femininity is defined through attachment, 
male gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender 
identity is threatened by separation.‖79 
 
As we recall, Levinas describes the phenomenon of the erotic thus: 
―The relationship does not ipso facto neutralize alterity but preserve 
it… The other as other is not here an object that becomes ours or 
becomes us; to the contrary, it withdraws into its mystery.‖80   
―It is a relationship with alterity, with mystery – that is to say, with the 
future, with what (in a world where there is everything) is never 
there.‖81  
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It may be Gilligan who deciphers the secret of which Levinas speaks:  
―The elusive mystery of women‘s development lies in its recognition of 
the continuing importance of attachment in the human life cycle. 
Woman‘s place in man‘s life cycle is to protect this recognition while 
the development litany intones the celebration of separation, autonomy, 
individuation, and natural rights. The myth of Persephone speaks 
directly to the distortion in this view by reminding us that narcissism 
leads to death, that the fertility of the earth is in some mysterious way 
tied to the continuation of the mother-daughter relationship, and that the 
life cycle itself arises from alternation between the world of woman and 
that of men.‖82 
 
Should feminine moral reasoning, we may ask, be seen as a product of anatomical, biological 
difference, or of the existence of a feminine spirit, or is it in fact a product of social or 
psychoanalytic factors that shape society and mold the individual boy or girl within the 
society into one of the available patterns? 
 
Feminine morality is described by Gilligan as a characteristic of the feminine, and it would 
seem that Levinas, too, is prepared to accept this moral description of responsibility, of 
concern, of empathy as feminine characteristics. Therefore he employs the terms of hosting, 
of dwelling, and of motherhood, but for Levinas these characteristics of morality are applied 
to both the feminine and the masculine. 
While Gilligan describes feminine morality as related to the feminine character, which is 
different from the masculine, and thus feminine morality stems from something internal to 
women (a stand which drew sharp criticism from some quarters), for Levinas ethics can be 
described as founded upon feminine phenomena, but the ethical imperative does not have its 
source in a human character that includes responsibility, empathy, or dependence and 
relationship toward another person. For him, the ethical imperative is the opposite of the 
natural will, or the will of what exists to continue to do so and to provide itself with pleasure. 
 31 
That imperative stems from the disturbance of the face of Other, the interference of encounter 
with someone of the other sex, and even in the threat that comes from another person. It is not 
a positive predilection, about which one may say that it either is there or is not there. It is an 
imperative that imposes itself upon the natural and about which one may say that it is beyond 
the I, beyond the subject, and approaches it by one‘s being addressed by another subject, 
masculine or feminine.83 
 
The Talmud employs the figure of Elijah to explain the significance of the feminine.84  
Levinas writes that Elijah‘s image exemplifies the possibility of change that one person can 
accomplish. The Elijah of the Bible is a most masculine figure. He does not have a wife. He is 
zealous, even fanatic. But in the talmudic legend, it is nevertheless Elijah who offers 
instruction in the feminine. Furthermore, rabbinic literature portrays him as a soft, tender, 
comforting person.  
 
Levinas himself advocated this kind of thinking, in his conversations with Philip Nemo:  
―Perhaps […] all these allusion to the ontological differences between 
the masculine and the feminine would appear less archaic if […] they 
would signify that the participation in the masculine and in the feminine 
were the attribute of every human being. Could this be the meaning of 
the enigmatic verse of Genesis 1:27, ―male and female created He 
them?‖85  
 
Similarly, in a conversation with Bracha Lichtenberg Etinger:    
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―Before the face of the other I am already obligated […] And then, 
there is the idea of the feminine, or of love, of love relationship with the 
woman […] But it has this meaning in the face of any presence of the 
other, for every human being.‖86  
 
There are two interpretations possible here. The first is an androgyny that would explain the 
female and male aspects of each person. One can present this kind of thinking as a Jungian 
thought. This option may appear congruent with Levinas‘s position as described above, the 
duality that is previous to gender difference. This option, though, does not take the category 
of the feminine seriously.  
 
The second option, far more significant, is that gender difference is fundamental for Levinas, 
although for the masculine the feminine has implications. The feminine demands that the 
individual internalize the female ethic. The feminine is no longer an abstract category but an 
ethical imperative.  
 
Perhaps it is possible to see this insight in Levinas‘s interpretation of circumcision. Levinas 
suggest understanding circumcision as a form of castration, just as Freud did.87 Circumcision 
is regarded as an act of damage, a primary injury that precedes all the other injuries that will 
come in the future.  
 
Levinas regards this primary injury as an opening toward others.88 The deep meaning of this 
damage is described by Levinas as damage done to the ego, as damage done specifically to 
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virility, in order that the person will be slightly feminine. It is not merely a mode of 
castration, but a choice of alternative modes of subjectivity:89   
 ―It is linked with the conclusion of the covenant, with the considerable 
event in the heavenly Torah of a sociality between man and the 
transcendence, with sociality being accomplished as transcendence. 
This is a concept essential to Judaism: that the consent to a corporeal 
wound to be undergone – or to have one‘s newborn son undergo – 
places us beyond all pious rhetoric and outside the pure ―inner realm‖ in 
which ambiguity, amidst unverifiable ‗mysteries.‘‖90 
 
For Levinas, readiness to be injured creates the dimension of an ―inner realm‖ of openess to 
the other. Circumcision makes the ―inner realm‖ of the feminine possible for the masculine.  
The female movement of transcendence can be internalized by the masculine subject.  
 
One important aspect of the circumcision ceremony is naming and being named. Abraham 
acquires his new name at the time of his circumcision. This bodily reduction of virility is a 
foundational event that reconstructs the Subject. For Levinas the circumcised man is now 
subordinate to the feminine: after Abraham‘s circumcision, God tells him, ―In all that Sarah 
says to you, obey her voice‖ (Genesis 21:12). 
 
Should we see in this phrase the full meaning of the feminine as an alternative Subjectivity?  
 ―Is this new interdiction? A related side issue? Or, on the contrary, an 
essential problem for ‗a time that overflows memories? Will the 
woman‘s condition for ever remain inseparable from the possessive that 
contains – or deforms – the second syllable of a word meaning, in the 
case of Abraham‘s wife, the sovereignty of a princess? The sovereignty 
of a princess or of a human person! But also the sovereignty of a 
woman, who in a masculine world, always runs the risk of being taken 
as a thing to be owned. The dramatic ambiguity of the feminine, which 
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has won her only the folklore supremacy of the woman celebrated in a 
song, but already owned; sung, but a plaything – incapable of validation 
as humanity rising above the local setting to be a princess for all 
humanity. The dramatic ambiguity of the feminine that vanishes in the 
world of Abraham exceeding the past. Henceforth, dignity of the person 
that has regained her fullness and accedes to the highest vocations of 
the human. This ontological correction is announced by God precisely 
to the husband. Abraham will soon hear ( Genesis 21:12): ‗And in all 
that Sarah says to you, obey her voice.‘ In prophecy itself, a possible 
subordination of the male inspiration to the female.‖ 91    
 
 
As mentioned above, Levinas makes a connection between God and the womb. The idea of 
divinity as womb is one that makes it possible to describe God‘s infinite nature as an 
openness to different possibilities, an openness to a future time that will arrive by human 
agency. The womb as the possibility of containment, the ability of opening up to the other, is 
a distinctly feminine phenomenon: 
―Rakhamim is the relation of the uterus to the other, whose gestation 
takes places within it. Rakhamim is maternity itself. God as merciful is 
God defined by maternity. A feminine element is stirred in the depth of 
this mercy. This maternal element in divine paternity is very 
remarkable.‖ 92  
  
The depiction of the feminine as inclusive finds expression in the Tabernacle and the Tent of 
Meeting - Ohel Moed. This was where God revealed Himself to Moses and to Israel, during 
the forty years of wandering. This tent is an open space for gathering and encounter/93 This 
special place makes the covenant possible. This tent is parallel to the womb, to the divine 
womb that represents God as an encompassing space.  
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We may thus say: 
Levinas‘s stance toward the ethical imperative, as an imperative that comes from another 
person and precedes the subjective, is similar and parallel to the view of feminine morality 
proposed by Gilligan, which is founded upon responsibility and nearness. 
Levinas‘s ethical position is not directed at women or men alone; it is directed at the 
individual as such. 
Levinas‘s descriptions of the characteristics of the feminine and of feminine phenomena are 
close in meaning to his ethical imperative. 
Levinas may be suspected, in describing the feminine, of applying characteristics of 
masculine thinking in order to capture the feminine phenomenon. 
The ethical imperative is, at its base, described by the phenomenon of the external, by the face 
of the Other commanding ―Thou shalt not murder.‖ But Levinas describes another ethical 
imperative whose source is in an inward movement, the transcendent movement of the 
feminine. 
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